

Transatlantic Homeland Defense

Context

This paper proposes an initiative to enhance transatlantic homeland defense at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) November 2006 Riga Summit and beyond. As NATO develops its capabilities for expeditionary operations, it needs to revitalize plans and capabilities essential to realize its core mission: protecting Alliance territory as outlined in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. This back-to-basics approach is designed to ensure that Allies can protect the transatlantic homeland against an array of new threats and challenges. This initiative would unfold in the context of broader efforts to protect the Euro-Atlantic community. NATO is but one of many institutions—national and international, governmental and nongovernmental—involved in societal security.

Key Points

Homeland defense—that is, the military's role in preventing and defending against terrorist attacks on the territory of Alliance members—is an increasingly important imperative for the United States, Canada and Europe. NATO has the opportunity to articulate a strategic direction and planning process for homeland defense to ensure that relevant Alliance activities and capabilities are adapted and integrated to deal with these new threats. NATO's activities in many areas—for example, its protection of Mediterranean sealanes against weapons of mass

destruction (WMD) and terrorists—provide multiple elements that can be united to form a homeland defense initiative at Riga. Such an initiative would be intended to complement, not detract from, national and European Union (EU) capabilities and institutions that bear the major responsibility for ensuring homeland security. This initiative would offer NATO both a 21st-century approach to Article 5 and new meaning and credibility in the eyes of NATO publics who are concerned about threats to their homelands.¹

This report proposes that enhanced transatlantic homeland defense be a major initiative for adoption at the 2006 Riga Summit and completion at the 2008 summit. Accompanying this initiative would be parallel proposals on strengthening partnerships with nonmembers and further improving NATO's military forces and capabilities for new-era missions. The initiative would include four categories of homeland defense, none of which would address expeditionary, counterterrorism, natural disaster, and humanitarian missions outside the NATO area. In some cases, capabilities created for homeland defense purposes could be used within and outside the NATO area for such civil-military missions. The four categories are:

- guarding the approaches and achieving border security for the NATO region
- pursuing enhanced/integrated and linked continental early warning and air/missile defense capabilities
- preventing and managing terrorist incidents
- strengthening transatlantic capabilities for consequence management, ranging from

terrorist use of WMD to large-scale natural disasters.

NATO and its members already possess noteworthy capabilities in some respects in these areas, but their capacity to act as a fully organized and capable alliance is not well developed. NATO will need improvements in physical assets and strengthened strategic planning and operating capacities. It also will require close coordination and harmonization with national governments, many of which view control of homeland security resources as vital manifestations of their sovereignty. The ultimate outcome of decisive action in these areas would be enhanced NATO capabilities to protect member airports, seaports, maritime approaches, and critical infrastructure; defend against future missile threats; prevent and manage terrorist incidents; and react promptly to WMD use.

NATO-EU Cooperation

The rationale for a NATO homeland defense initiative is that the vital interests of all member nations are involved; hence, their cooperation will be critical to achieving improved capabilities. NATO's political and practical collaboration with the European Union will also be crucial. Many Europeans view the EU as the main institution for promoting European integration across a spectrum of economic, political, and—increasingly—foreign policy and security activities. To be successful, a NATO initiative on homeland defense would have to complement existing national and EU programs. It also would have to provide an important collaborative role for the EU,

This report is a joint project of the Center for Technology and National Security Policy and the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. It was prepared by Neyla Arnas, Hans Binnendijk, Stephen J. Flanagan, Stuart E. Johnson, Richard L. Kugler, Leo G. Michel, Anne M. Moisan, Jeffrey Simon, and Kimberley L. Thachuk.

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which is seeking to develop a value-added role to complement and integrate national capabilities for civilian and civil-military crisis management. As a consequence, many common European capabilities related to societal/homeland security and emergency response (such as customs, police cooperation, environmental security, and information-sharing) are likely to be housed within the EU in the future.² Since 19 of the 25 EU member states are members of NATO, and 4 of the remaining 6 are Partnership for Peace (PFP) members, they are unlikely to be inclined to duplicate activities in NATO and/or the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) to which they already are committed in an EU context. An initiative linking NATO and the EU in a common cause could have a positive impact on their cooperation in other areas as well, such as civil-military operations outside the Euro-Atlantic space. In short, the proposed approach would create a win-win outcome rather than a zero-sum game.

Of the four categories surveyed here, the first two (guarding approaches and air/missile defense) are mainly military and thus are largely NATO's business when they require U.S.-European military integration. The third category, preventing and managing terrorist incidents within the NATO region, will require Alliance participation only when EU or national capabilities are overwhelmed. Because NATO involvement would come as a last resort, it must be prepared and able to respond if asked to do so. The fourth category, consequence management, requires a mixture of military and civilian assets and therefore will require national or EU cooperation.

Thus far, the European Union has undertaken a range of activities and initiatives aimed at improving its military and civilian capabilities and structures to respond to crises spanning both homeland defense and homeland security, including cross-border cooperation on consequence management for natural and manmade disasters (such as terrorist attacks, port security, and protection of critical infrastructure). For the most part, these activities were either spawned or accelerated by the Madrid (2004) and London (2005) bombings. The European Union has developed a European Security Strategy and a Strategy Against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and has a situation center in Brussels that provides valuable EU-wide threat assessments to national governments. An

example of an EU response to a disaster was the *Prestige* accident in November 2002, in which a tanker sank off the west coast of Galicia, Spain, releasing 44,000 tons of fuel. In response to a Spanish government request, EU member states made available floating barriers, ships, and surveillance planes. This action was carried out under EU agreements by the EU Commission's Monitoring and Information Center.

EU officials and documents acknowledge that EU activities and initiatives are at various stages of development, with some in their early stage. For example, the European Council agreed in 2005 (during the British presidency) to examine a Commission proposal for an integrated "rapid response and preparedness instrument" to react to all types of disasters (including terrorism) inside or outside the EU while setting a goal to finalize crisis coordination operational procedures by June 2006. This examination includes work on possible support that member state military assets and capabilities could give to consequence management within an EU context.

Broad political support exists for these crisis response and management efforts within the EU. For example, during the British presidency,

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senior UK officials, including Secretary of State for Defence John Reid, noted that development of EU civil-military coordination—covering analysis, planning, and management of capabilities and operations—was a top priority. Finnish officials have expressed similar sentiments (Finland will assume the EU presidency during July-December 2006, overlapping the Riga Summit).

Given U.S. interests and equities in improved cooperation with the EU, bilaterally and through NATO—a goal shared by almost all EU members—any new initiative on homeland defense at the Riga Summit should be couched as one aspect of improved overall cooperation. This will require careful advance scrutiny to determine what the

European Union already has in place or is developing, and where NATO can offer real value added. Creating a joint clearinghouse of capabilities would allow the EU and NATO to determine how best to meet the requirement of a specific crisis.

Moreover, Europeans have diverse constitutional approaches to domestic uses/authorities of their own militaries in crisis situations, and these are sensitive issues.³ (For example, Germany's Constitutional Court recently found that the Ministry of Defense does not have legal authority to shoot down a terrorist-controlled aircraft if it would kill innocent civilians aboard.) Any suggestion that a "NATO commander" would somehow have authority over foreign forces or capabilities deployed within a member state will be viewed skeptically. Thus, a demonstrated U.S. willingness to initiate a discussion within NATO on transatlantic homeland defense that is cast in the context of NATO-EU cooperation and offers a mutually beneficial solution stands a plausible chance of gaining widespread consensus.

Guarding the Approaches

A Riga initiative in this category could have widespread appeal because this is a natural ongoing mission for NATO as well as an important, growing strategic priority in the current era. Simply stated, NATO's approaches, especially its maritime approaches, need greater security from terrorists and other threats than they currently have. With a modest commitment of military and other resources, coupled with improved strategic planning and coordination by NATO civilian and military staffs, regional security could be enhanced. Building upon programs already being pursued, additional progress in this category could be made quickly in the years after the Riga Summit, thus showing success and commitment at the summit in 2008.

Existing Capabilities. NATO has been active in new arenas in recent years. For example, NATO airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft were used to provide air surveillance at the recent Athens and Turin Olympic games and the 2004 European football championships. Existing Alliance capabilities in the area of guarding the maritime approaches to the transatlantic homeland are especially noteworthy. In October 2001, Allies implemented

Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and agreed to deploy NATO forces to protect the approaches to Alliance territory from terrorist threats. Allied ships and aircraft soon began patrols in the eastern Mediterranean in what became Operation *Active Endeavor*. These patrols now help detect, deter, and protect against terrorist activity in this vital and crowded sealane, through which flows 65 percent of Europe's energy and a large percentage of other seaborne trade.

In February 2003, the operation was expanded to include escort of merchant vessels from Allied states passing through the narrow Straits of Gibraltar, where they might be vulnerable to terrorist targets. In April 2003, NATO expanded *Active Endeavor's* scope to include boarding operations in compliance with international law. In 2004, the Alliance extended *Active Endeavor's* area of operations to include the entire Mediterranean. It also welcomed participation by EAPC/PFP Partners and Mediterranean Dialogue countries and put into place a new operational pattern focused on gathering and processing information and intelligence to target specific vessels of interest. As of March 2006, *Active Endeavor* had completed its 100th compliant boarding of a suspect vessel, while monitoring 75,000 vessels and providing escort to 480 ships.

NATO's Standing Naval Force Mediterranean and Standing Naval Force Atlantic support this mission. Several NATO members—mainly Greece, Italy, Spain, and Turkey—contribute naval assets directly; Mediterranean Allies provide substantial logistic support; and several northern European Allies provide fast patrol boats for escort operations. Three PFP countries (Croatia, Georgia, and Sweden) and three Mediterranean Dialogue countries (Algeria, Israel, and Morocco), as well as Russia and Ukraine, have indicated a desire to participate in the operation.

Potential Improvements. This mutual interest of Allies and Partners to ensure the safety of maritime transit provides NATO an opportunity to enhance defense of its homeland approaches, including container security on the high seas, support to civil authorities, and the security of Partners. *Active Endeavor* has expanded the sharing of data collected at sea by Allies and Mediterranean rim countries. The Commander, Allied Maritime Component Command Naples, has developed the Joint

Information and Analysis Center (JIAC), an experimental networking system that provides analysis and warning, as well as information on deployment of assets, in order to ensure timely action by appropriate authorities.

Fuller development of the JIAC could help galvanize NATO member and Partner efforts to provide a two-way flow of usable information for countering terrorism, illegal trafficking, and WMD proliferation in the maritime domain. This information could be shared with coast guards and appropriate national and EU law enforcement and civilian authorities to enhance port and border security.

NATO member states could also take additional steps to integrate and selectively deploy with *Active Endeavor* and other operations their chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) detection capabilities to diminish

fuller development of the JIAC could help galvanize NATO member and Partner efforts to provide a two-way flow of usable information

further the threat of catastrophic terrorist attacks before they reach their shores. Capabilities in ground, air, and coastal surveillance, port security, airport security, and CBRN detection could be improved to bolster support of civil homeland security authorities. Finally, establishment of a NATO Training Center in the Mediterranean Dialogue region that focuses on port security could deepen mutual security in that area.

The Black Sea region is increasingly important to Europe and the United States as a major East-West energy supply bridge and as a barrier to many transnational threats. Littoral states, led by Turkey, have initiated steps to enhance regional economic and security cooperation. In March 2004, the Turkish navy launched *Black Sea Harmony* to monitor traffic on the southern sections of the Black Sea and invited other littoral states to join. However, Turkey and Russia have both rejected NATO's proposal to extend *Active Endeavor* into the Black Sea. This stance, driven by objections to a permanent presence by nonlittoral states, does not need to impede realization of NATO's goals of enhancing security of the maritime

approaches to the homeland. NATO might express its support for *Black Sea Harmony*, encourage Allied littoral states (Bulgaria and Romania) to join, and develop an exchange of information through the JIAC.

Air/Missile Defense

The United States is beginning deployment of national missile defenses against intercontinental ballistic missile threats posed by new-era adversaries such as North Korea and Iran. A small defense shield of 100 to 150 midcourse interceptor missiles (employing hit-to-kill technology) is being contemplated, and other systems, including boost-phase missiles and high-energy lasers, are being developed. Yet such threats might not be confined to the United States. Iran's development of nuclear weapons with missile delivery systems in the next few years would provide a direct threat to Europe of the sort that could build support for deployment of a NATO missile defense force.

Existing Capabilities. NATO recently has been studying options for missile defense. Its Theatre Missile Defence Programme seeks to field an active layered theater ballistic missile defense with the capability to protect deployed troops against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles by 2010. Defense ministers approved a technical blueprint in 2004, and Allies have subsequently agreed to commit resources to develop a command and control and planning capability. At the Prague Summit, Allies agreed to study options for protecting populations against ballistic missile threats of all ranges and will evaluate these options on the basis of contractor studies. Thus, NATO is not yet seeking a missile defense of population centers in continental Europe comparable to that being deployed by the United States. Some members are pursuing research and development programs for missile defense, and major studies on European missile defense options are now under way.

Today, NATO air defense is focused on traditional threats to European airspace. The NATO Air Command and Control System Management Organization provides the structure for the planning and implementation of the command and control system supporting NATO air defense operations. Simply stated, NATO has a large traditional air defense system composed

of AWACS, fighter interceptors, and surface-to-air missiles, but it has no near-term prospects for deploying a missile defense system for the European continent.

Potential Improvements. Should a NATO homeland defense initiative include heightened emphasis on continental missile defense? This controversial question is likely to generate a wide spectrum of answers, but as matters now stand, Europe is not prepared to deploy missile defenses in the foreseeable future.

Requirements studies establishing the framework for an active layered theater ballistic missile defense are mature enough that advance engineering work can be done to refine the concepts that would set the stage for the integration of NATO–EU air/missile defense processes. Based on earlier studies, Allies could establish a Missile Defense Technical Center to focus further research and development.

The Riga Summit plausibly could call upon NATO to accelerate its assessment of an architecture for protecting Alliance territory and populations against the full range of missile threats. This could include a call for greater research and development efforts on promising technologies by participating countries, as well as intensified studies and analyses of potential deployment options. To respond to the threat of attacks on Europe by cruise missiles from southern locations, the Riga Summit could call for enhanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.

Counterterrorism

Article 5 was invoked for the first time in NATO history in a counterterrorism context on September 12, 2001, following the terrorist attacks on the United States. As a result, NATO's Article 5 focus has shifted from the traditional territorial defense of the Cold War era to emphasize counterterrorism. From October 2001 to May 2002, Operation *Eagle Assist* resulted in NATO AWACS aircraft being sent to help patrol skies over the United States. The need to consider terrorist threats has been a regular theme of NATO summits since then; for example, the Istanbul Summit of 2004 called for NATO to develop improved intelligence, rapid response assistance after attacks, and assistance in protecting high-visibility events. Nonetheless, counterterrorism within the NATO region has remained mostly the responsibility of national ministries (such as the Federal Bureau of

Investigation and the Department of Homeland Security in the United States) and of multilateral police and law-enforcement organizations.

Increasingly, the Europeans are trying to use the European Union to coordinate counterterrorism activities. The organization has established a counterterrorism action plan, and its situation center continuously provides threat assessments to all EU members. Throughout Europe, NATO is mainly viewed as a helpful adjunct to counterterrorist missions within the NATO region, not a lead agency. Even so, NATO will continue to play a role in preventing and managing terrorist incidents, especially when indigenous capabilities require reinforcement.

Allies could establish a Missile Defense Technical Center to focus further research and development

Current Capabilities. NATO's main role in counterterrorism has been to help provide continental early warning and air/missile defense as well as protection of vital sealanes through Operation *Active Endeavor*. It also provides protection of its own military assets. In the event of terrorist strikes, especially involving WMD use, NATO military forces could be mobilized to back up first responders for disaster relief. NATO has established a Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit to analyze threats against Europe. Member states of the EAPC established a Partnership Action Plan Against Terrorism to promote and facilitate cooperation among its members in the fight against terrorism. NATO's largest role in the war on terror, of course, has been its involvement in operations outside its territory and that of its Partners—for example, its participation in the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan since August 2003, its role in training Iraqi security forces, and its contributions to stability in the Balkans. But these are missions outside its territory, not homeland defense missions within its territory.

Potential Improvements. NATO nations are developing new, cutting-edge technologies to protect troops and civilians against terrorist attacks, including technology for the early detection, protection, and destruction of improvised explosive devices. Measures that

protect critical infrastructure (ports, platforms, and energy pipelines) should be emphasized in cooperation with EU efforts in this area. In addition, further measures to strengthen NATO intelligence collection and sharing capabilities would contribute to counterterrorism efforts within the NATO region.

Flexible response to countering terrorism requires a special operations force (SOF) capability. Such forces are expensive to organize, train, and equip, and are in great demand and short supply. NATO could explore a mechanism for nations to pool their SOF assets in order to respond promptly to a major challenge that would require NATO to assist overwhelmed individual nations.

The reinforced North Atlantic Council at Defense Ministers Level (NAC–D) could hold meetings with interior ministers on counterterrorism issues. A NATO exchange with Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) countries could be created by holding an annual conference focusing on the challenges of transnational threats, terrorism, and countermeasures. NATO also could explore how securing pipelines, offshore platforms, and ports to assure energy supplies in wartime defense could be applied to antiterrorist protection of critical infrastructure. Finally, NATO should establish mechanisms for cooperation with national police forces and other local first responders.

Consequence Management

Consequence management requirements could arise in response to challenges ranging from terrorist WMD use, to pandemics, to large-scale natural disasters in the NATO region. NATO planning, logistical, and operational capabilities could provide unique support to the responsible national and EU authorities in the face of such catastrophic incidents. Improving NATO's capabilities for consequence management support could be part of a Riga Summit agenda on homeland defense.

Existing Capabilities. For defense against WMD, NATO countries are jointly developing five nuclear, biological, and chemical defense initiatives: a deployable analytical laboratory, an event response team, a virtual center of excellence for nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons defense, a defense stockpile,

and a disease surveillance system. In addition, a multinational NATO chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense battalion achieved full operational capability in 2004. Many of the key capabilities for responding to a CBRN event are resident in European and U.S. military forces, which could be called upon to assist first responders. NATO's Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee has developed a Civil Emergency Planning Action Plan, which calls for the development of nonbinding guidelines and minimum standards for the protection of the civil population against CBRN risks. In addition, countries have prepared inventories of national civil and military capabilities that could be made available in the event of CBRN attacks.

There is precedent for NATO's involvement in disaster relief in its own region and beyond. NATO assisted victims of Hurricane Katrina in autumn 2005 and aided Pakistanis in the aftermath of the October 2005 earthquake. It also has provided assistance to the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, and other countries in response to flooding and to Portugal in response to forest fires. NATO's Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center is the focal point for coordinating disaster relief efforts of the 46 EAPC nations—in case of natural or technological disasters. The small staff is headed by NATO's Director of Civil Emergency Planning. In the case of the Pakistan earthquake, NATO sent engineers, medical units, helicopters and crews, and a field hospital from its Response Force.

Potential Improvements. Experiences from natural disasters to high-end terrorist attacks indicate that a nation might need to supplement its indigenous capabilities in eight categories:

- decontamination teams to respond to CBRN attack
- local airlift assets (primarily transport helicopters)
- logistic support assets (primarily trucks and forklifts)
- communications and intelligence assets
- emergency medical teams
- constabulary forces and military police
- engineers, including explosive ordnance disposal
- Civil-Military Coordination Group capabilities.

Units with these capabilities exist in NATO member forces. The Alliance's capacity would

be strengthened by deliberate planning and force execution for consequence management in the event of a catastrophic incident.

NATO should undertake a homeland defense requirements and capabilities study. It should strengthen its structure and capacity for deliberate planning in order to identify requirements, develop force goals, and help guide national plans and programs to fruition. The formation of military disaster assistance response teams with a chemical-biological decontamination capability should be considered. In addition, NATO needs to ensure that its military forces for consequence management missions are properly trained and prepared. The acquisition of larger stocks of supplies and materials that might be needed in catastrophic terrorist attacks, especially WMD situations, should be investigated.

NATO could develop planning exchanges with subregional organizations such as South-eastern Europe Defense Ministerial/South-eastern Europe Brigade or various Black Sea

formation of military disaster assistance teams with a chemical-biological decontamination capability should be considered

groupings to enhance subregional planning and cooperation with Partners.

NATO's new Comprehensive Political Guidance has highlighted the need to plan for stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) operations. As the force planning process focuses on S&R requirements, member countries likely will respond to some degree. Most S&R forces and capabilities will be useful in a variety of consequence management missions.

NATO's military requirements for consequence management are proving to be larger than appeared to be the case only a few years ago. In addition to strengthening its military capabilities in this arena, NATO could pursue other improvements:

- develop NATO standards for cybersecurity, particularly those essential to energy, communications, and transportation
- conduct NAC-D meetings with interior ministers and, as appropriate, health ministers to review NATO's capacity to respond to consequence management challenges⁴

- create a Civil Emergency Planning Action Plan tailored for Mediterranean Dialogue/ICI countries and Black/Caspian Sea Partners

- conduct exercises, involving NATO, the EU, and other multinational institutions that involve serious incidents of various sorts, including cyberattacks on governments, power grids, and air traffic systems

- strengthen multinational information-sharing on threat assessments, incident reporting, and early warning.

Command and Force Posture

Important command and force posture issues arise in determining how NATO's role in homeland defense can best be strengthened. How can NATO headquarters best organize for these new challenges? Should NATO have a command equivalent to the U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) to plan and implement homeland defense missions? Can existing NATO military capabilities be used to perform homeland defense missions, or should new capabilities be created?

NATO headquarters would no doubt need additional assets focused on homeland defense missions. The Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee and its Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center might need larger staffs. Beyond this, it may be necessary to create an Assistant Secretary General for Homeland Defense with appropriate staff to chart NATO's future in this arena. This planning in NATO could also be linked to similar efforts in other regional organizations, such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation. Creation of a Homeland Defense Committee to advise the NAC might also be a good idea.

With regard to military staffs, the United States needed USNORTHCOM because it had no other command for homeland defense. By contrast, NATO's military commands were organized primarily to manage territorial defense of Europe. Thus, a NATO NORTHCOM equivalent does not appear necessary. However, some improvements to the existing military command structure may make sense. Allied Command Operations (ACO) is the logical headquarters for planning the use of NATO military forces for homeland defense missions. Below ACO, a proven command concept is to designate one of

the principal subordinate operational headquarters as the deployable headquarters for handling homeland security missions. This would involve converting an existing principal subordinate command to handle homeland defense issues rather than creating a new one.

NATO authorities will need to analyze the issue of how new homeland defense missions should affect the force posture. A new small but highly ready force may need to be created for this purpose. Forces of lesser readiness are the equivalent of U.S. Reserve Component forces but can be mobilized over a period of weeks. These units will provide sufficient manpower and equipment in aggregate to handle the biggest homeland defense missions: incident management of WMD use or, as a lesser included case, natural disasters that clearly overload national and EU response capabilities. Yet close inspection may show that existing forces lack necessary capabilities in specific areas: for example, medical support, engineers, military police, and transport units. To the extent such deficiencies arise, NATO force planners will need to seek the necessary changes in forces, equipment, training, and readiness.

The alternative to relying upon existing forces is to convert forces to provide new capabilities oriented to homeland defense missions, especially consequence management. Because NATO's members have active-duty forces that significantly exceed potential requirements for warfighting and related crisis response, some of the forces could be converted to homeland defense missions.

The tradeoff among three options will have to be analyzed carefully:

- rely upon existing forces and capabilities for homeland defense missions
- rely upon existing forces, but approve a contingency headquarters and organizational design that provide additional capabilities as warranted by homeland defense requirements
- create a new command and assign forces that are sized, equipped, and trained exclusively for the homeland defense mission.

Action Agenda/Recommendations

At the Riga Summit, NATO should focus on homeland defense as a key part of its deliberations. The overall goal should be to point NATO in the direction of developing better capabilities for performing future homeland defense missions in concert with European countries and the EU. Specifically:

- The Riga Summit Declaration should include a statement of principles on a "Homeland Defense Initiative," underscoring that NATO will undertake this initiative in cooperation with ongoing national and EU efforts, with a view to develop a capacity that can be used to complement national capacities and be available when these are overwhelmed.

- The Riga Summit should announce new homeland defense activities for PFP, designed to enhance Partner capabilities for homeland defense missions.

- In appropriate areas, the Riga Summit should announce a few specific force and organizational changes aimed at producing improved homeland defense capabilities in the near term.

- NATO headquarters and military staffs should conduct a study of future homeland defense requirements, capabilities, costs, and improvement priorities, and report the results in the near future.

Notes

¹ Former Spanish Prime Minister José María Aznar, and his *Fundación para el Análisis y los Estudios Sociales* (FAES) colleagues Rafael Bardají and Florentino Portero, made a compelling case for renewed Alliance attention to homeland defense efforts in their report *NATO: An Alliance for Freedom* (Madrid: FAES, 2005), 22–29. We have included and expanded upon several of their proposals in framing this initiative.

² For an overview of the European Union's approach to homeland security, see Gustav E. Gustenau, "The Concept of Homeland Security in the European Union and in Austria: A Challenge for the Austrian EU Presidency," in *Transforming Homeland Security: U.S. and European Approaches*, ed. Esther Brimmer (Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins University School for Advanced International Studies, 2006), 59–80.

³ For a review of European national approaches to "societal" or homeland security, see *Protecting the Homeland: European Approaches to Societal Security—Implications for the United States*, ed. Daniel Hamilton, Bengt Sundelius, and Jesper Gronvall (Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins University School for Advanced International Studies, 2006).

⁴ For a discussion on forging new health security alliances, see Daniel S. Hamilton and Bradley T. Smith, "Atlantic Storm," in *European Molecular Biology Organization Report*, 7, no. 1 (2006), 4–9.

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Hans Binnendijk
Director, CTNSP

Col Merrick E. Krause, USAF
Director, NDU Press

Stephen J. Flanagan
Director, INSS